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STUDENT OR EMPLOYEE? —
THE STATUS OF MEDICAL
RESIDENTS IN RELATION
TO FICA TAXES
ERIC S. SMITH
WEBER STATE UNIVERSITY

ABSTRACT
This article considers an issue which was resolved by the Supreme Court in the
2010 Term: the status of medical residents with respect to FICA taxes. Specifically, at
issue was whether medical residents qualify as students under Section 3121(b)(10) of
the Internal Revenue Code, which qualification exempts both the resident and the
university/hospital residency program from paying FICA taxes. Included with analysis
of the various courts‟ opinions leading up to the Supreme Court decision are two brief
case studies. The first focuses on an individual medical resident in the Penn State
University Dermatology Residency Program, which considers whether his
relationship with the program is closer to that of a student or employee. The second is
a quantitative examination of randomly sampled medical residency programs within
the geographic borders of various circuits. Both studies are guided by factors
presented by one of the circuit courts for determining whether a medical resident
qualifies as a student. I conclude, contrary to the Supreme Court, that the four circuit
courts which adopted a case-by-case, facts and circumstances analysis of each medical
residency program were correct in their analysis and that a practical analysis of the
duties and functions of residents indicates that they are students who should be
exempt from FICA taxes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Insurance Contributions Act of 1935 imposes two separate
employment taxes: 1) the Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax
and 2) the Medicare Insurance Tax. Combined, these taxes are commonly referred to
as FICA taxes. Codified in Sections 3101 and 3111 of the Internal Revenue Code,
FICA taxes for Social Security and Medicare are imposed on employers and
employees based on wages paid (26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3111). Statutory rates of 6.2%
for Social Security taxes and 1.45% for Medicare taxes are withheld from an
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employee’s earned wages and combined with a matching payment of the same amount
by the employer (26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3111).1
Section 3121 defines how this employment tax is to be levied. It broadly
defines “wages” as “all remuneration for employment” (26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)). The
same section similarly defines “employment” using a broad brush as “any service of
whatever nature” (26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)). Narrowing the scope of this definition,
however, are twenty-one provisions which categorically exclude certain work from
the definition of employment (26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(1) - § 3121(b)(21)). A split arose
among the federal circuits with respect to the tenth of these exclusions, Section
3121(b)(10), which carves out from the definition of employment “service performed
in the employ of a school, college, or university . . . , if such service is performed by a
student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at such school, college or
university” (26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10)). The specific issue pertaining to this statute was
the validity of Treasury Regulations recently issued which per se exclude full-time
employees (40 hours or more per week), and consequently medical residents, from the
status of student.
This new interpretation of Section 3121(b)(10) caused considerable disruption
in the medical education world—specifically as it relates to medical residents.2
Initially, medical residents “presumptively” qualified as students under the
exclusionary language of Section 3121(b)(10) (Rowe, 2009, p.1399). Now, the fulltime employee limitation created in the new regulations clearly bars medical residents
from qualifying for exemption as students. This dichotomy created a split within the
circuit courts of appeals. At issue was the validity of the regulation’s full-time
employee exclusion and whether it was a valid exercise of the Department of
Treasury’s regulatory power. The Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have
all held the new regulations invalid on the grounds that the statutory language of
Section 3121(b)(10) unambiguously expresses the will of Congress and therefore
Treasury Regulations interpreting the unambiguous and common terms are invalid.
The rogue among the circuits was the Eighth Circuit. In June of 2009 in the case of
Mayo Foundation v. United States (2009), the Eighth Circuit upheld the new
1

While the Medicare tax rate of 1.45% is applied against the employee’s total earned income,
the Social Security tax rate of 6.2% is applied against wages up to a certain base amount. In 2010
and 2011, that amount is $106,800.
2
In addition to medical residents, whether the full-time employee exclusion is upheld by the
Supreme Court also has bearings on other student/employer relationships. For example, Treas.
Reg §31.3121(b)(10)-2(e) provides examples of scenarios in which students are employed as
university clerks, university staff, university facilities managers and teaching assistants and are
not exempt from FICA taxes on account of the full-time employment exclusion from the Student
FICA exception.
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regulations as permissibly interpreting the statute. On January 11, 2011 the Supreme
Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s position by upholding the full-time employee
exclusion.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This issue has been explored by then Washington & Lee University School of
Law student, Patrick Timothy Rowe, in the Washington and Lee Law Review article,
“The Impossible Student Exception to FICA Taxation and Its Applicability to Medical
Residents” (2009). The article, which was drafted prior to the Supreme Court’s
agreeing to consider the Mayo Foundation case, takes the position that graduate
medical education programs should be deemed institutions of higher education with
students who are exempt from FICA taxes. Going beyond arguing for a case-by-case,
facts and circumstances analysis as to whether the relationship between a medical
resident and a teaching hospital qualifies for the student exception, which is the
position argued for in this paper, the author contends that medical residents “should be
afforded the presumption of qualification under the student exception of section
3121(b)(10)” (Rowe, P.T. (2009)).
III. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY HISTORY OF SECTION
3121(b)(10)
1. THE STATUTE
Section 3121 of the Internal Revenue Code provides definitions for application
of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act of 1935. Subsection (b) of Section 3121
provides definitions specifically relating to what constitutes “employment” for
purposes of triggering FICA tax liability under the Act. Section 3121(b)(10) carves
out a “student FICA exception” from the definition of “employment,” thus creating
under the statute a scenario in which a student may render services for compensation
which is not subject to FICA withholdings. This exception applies to “services
performed in the employ of a school, college, or university . . ., if such service is
performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at such school,
college, or university” (26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10)).
The student FICA exception is among the remnants of what was originally a
very broad exception to the imposition of FICA taxes. Under the Social Security Act
Amendments of 1939, included among those exempt from paying social security tax
were all federal, state, and local government employees, including employees of
universities (whether a student or not), and a majority of employees employed by tax
exempt organizations (Pub. L. No. 76-379 sec. 606, §1426(b), (6) and (7) (1939)). In
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1950 these broad exemptions became infeasible given anticipated social security
funding requirements and were drastically curtailed, yet the student FICA exception
survived (Pub. L. No. 81-734, sec. 204(a), §1426(b)(11) (1949)).
These initial exceptions, while broad in terms of eligibility, were applied
narrowly, at least in the context of the student exception. Regulations issued in 1940
restricted the term “student” to those individuals who were “enrolled, regularly
attended classes, and [who] received nominal remuneration.” (20 C.F.R. § 403.821(a)
(1940)). Nominal remuneration was considered not to exceed $45. (20 C.F.R. §
403.82(b) (1940)). This narrow analysis, including its consideration of whether
consideration was nominal, was also abandoned in 1950 in favor of a fact-driven
analysis considering the circumstances giving rise to the relationship between the
student and the educational institution (H.R. Rep. No. 81-1300 (1950)).
2. INITIAL REGULATIONS AND REASON FOR AMENDMENT
This facts and circumstances analysis were promulgated under Treasury
Regulation Section 31.3121(b)(10)-2 and adopted a two-pronged test to determine
whether the student FICA exception properly applies. The first prong considered the
character of the organization, requiring that it be a “school, college, or university”
(Tres. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(b)). The second prong considered the status of the
employee and mandated that the student be “enrolled and regularly attending classes
at the school, college or university” (Tres. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(b)). To determine
whether the second prong was satisfied, the regulations further required that the
services rendered by the student to the school, college, or university be “incident to
and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study at such school, college, or
university” (Tres. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(c)).
In Minnesota v. Apfel (8th Cir. 1998), the State of Minnesota sued the
Commissioner of Social Security in federal district court for a refund of FICA taxes
remitted on stipends paid to medical residents at the University of Minnesota asserting
that the student FICA exception applied. The district court held for the state and found
that the medical residents qualified for exemption from paying FICA taxes under the
student exception. The Eighth Circuit Court affirmed. Based on this precedent,
medical schools around the country began suing for refunds of FICA taxes paid on
their medical residents‟ stipends.
As these cases made their way through the courts, with similar results in favor
of the taxpayer, rather than appealing adverse holdings, the IRS amended the initial
regulations issued under Section 3121(b)(10) to curtail the qualification requirements
of the student exception.
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3. AMENDED REGULATIONS
The amended regulations, which were published in December 2004, but did not
go into effect until April 1, 2005 (Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(f)), were a direct
response to the Apfel decision. The Department of Treasury conspicuously modified
the initial regulations to exclude medical residents as eligible students for FICA
exemption. For purposes of this study, the most significant amendment was in relation
to the second prong, wherein the new regulations expanded on the “incident to” test
by providing that services rendered by full-time employees (e.g. medical residents)
“are not incident to and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study” (Tres. Reg. §
31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)). Thus, “regardless of the employer’s classification, “an
employee whose normal work schedule is forty hours or more per week” (Treas. Reg.
§ 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)) was no longer eligible for the student exception and must pay
FICA taxes.
As justification for the full-time employee exclusion, the regulation created a
“predominant relationship” test, under which the student exception from paying FICA
taxes could only apply if “the educational aspect of the relationship between the
employer and the employee is predominant” relative to the “service aspect” of the
relationship (Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(i)). Acknowledging that this
“predominance” test could be applied on a case-by-case, facts and circumstances
analysis, through the full-time employee exclusion, the regulation explicitly
disqualified employees whose normal work schedule is forty hours or more per week
Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii).
While the IRS acknowledged the effective date of the new regulations, it took
the aggressive position that hospitals filing for refunds of FICA taxes paid prior to the
effective date should be denied. The grounds for the IRS‟s position was that there
existed a per se exclusion of medical residents from student status which applied even
before the issuance of Tres. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d). The IRS eventually conceded
the issue and issued refunds for tax years preceding the effective date.
IV. VALIDITY OF AMENDED REGULATIONS FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE
EXCLUSION
1. THE STANDARD REVIEW FOR AN AGENCY’S INTERPRETATION OF
A STATUTE: CHEVRON DOCTRINE
Within the context of administrative law, agencies are unique entities. All in
one, they encompass the three branches of government: executive—agencies enforce
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laws passed by Congress; legislative—agencies create law through regulation; and
judicial— through administrative hearings, agencies interpret the law.
It was the second of these functions, the legislative power of an agency, which
was ultimately at issue in each of the cases brought by various teaching hospitals
around the country. Specifically, whether the Department of Treasury’s full-time
employee exclusion from the student FICA exception was a proper use of its
legislative power.
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. (1984), the Supreme
Court established the standard of review for determining the validity of an agency’s
regulations. The Court created a two-part test which determined the level of deference
to which an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is
entitled. The first part of the Chevron test asks, “whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue” Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
(1984). If Congress’s intent is clear and unambiguous, “the court as well as the agency
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress” (Chevron v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. (1984)). On the other hand, “if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the analysis must shift to the second
part of the Chevron test which asks whether the agency’s answer to the ambiguity is
“based on a permissible construction of the statute” (Chevron v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. (1984)). In making this determination, a court need not conclude that the
agency’s interpretation was the “only one it could have permissibly adopted to uphold
the construction” of the statute. Nor must it conclude that the agency’s interpretation
is equivalent to how the court would have addressed the issue initially.
It is worth emphasizing at this point the significance of the first part of the
Chevron analysis in the ultimate survival of a regulation under judicial scrutiny.
Where the statute speaks directly to the issue at hand, the administrative body’s
additional interpretation of the statute will be for naught and will not survive if it
strays from or adds to that unambiguous meaning. The logic, of course, is that there is
no need to interpret the meaning of a statute when it is already clearly understood.
Conversely, if the statute is found ambiguous or without clear meaning with respect to
a specific issue, it is then ripe for the administrative body’s elucidation. Moreover,
having surmounted the initial hurdle of ambiguity, the agency’s interpretation of the
statute will be upheld so long as it survives the less arduous hurdle of being a
“permissible interpretation.”
The oddity and complexity of part one of the Chevron analysis is its subjective
nature. Whether the meaning of the statute is clear or ambiguous is largely a
determination made based on the reader’s own subjective perceptions and biases. That
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being the case, it is certainly possible that reasonable minds will differ in this
determination and is it not surprising to see differing outcomes when two different
courts analyze the same statute.
2. ALTERNATIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW: NATIONAL MUFFLER ASSN.
V. U.S.
Preceding the creation of the Chevron doctrine described above was an
alternative doctrine for reviewing the validity of a regulation based on reasonableness.
Specifically, the National Muffler standard of review3 considers, among other factors,
whether the rule set forth in a regulation “harmonizes with the plain language of the
statute, its origin, and its purpose” (National Muffler Assn. v. United States (1979)).
In effect, the National Muffler standard of review gives a lower level of
deference to the Department of Treasury’s regulatory authority in tax cases. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Foundation overruled National Muffler, a seminal
conclusion to the case (Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v.
United States (2011)). That notwithstanding, for purposes of this study, whether the
court applied Chevron or National Muffler, the result should have been the same: the
full-time employee exclusion created by Tres. Reg. 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d) should be
struck down in favor of a case-by-case facts and circumstances analysis of the
relationship between the medical resident and the teaching hospital.
3. THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS CASES, THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT: U.S. V. MOUNT SINAI MED. CENTER OF FLORIDA INC.
In 2000 and 2001, the IRS issued a refund of $2,450,177.32 to Mount Sinai
Medical Center for FICA taxes paid on stipend payments to medical residents during
the late 1990s. In 2002, the IRS sued Mount Sinai claiming the refund had been in
error because the medical residents did not qualify for exemption from FICA taxes.
As grounds for its ruling in favor of the IRS, the district court found Section
3121(b)(10) ambiguous.
The Eleventh Circuit Court, overturning the district court’s decision (United
States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Florida (S.D. Fla. 2006)) and holding in
favor of Mount Sinai, found the language of Section 3121(b)(10) unambiguous.
Consequently, no further interpretation was required. Explaining the lack of
ambiguity, the court noted that “by its plain terms, the student exemption does not
3

The issue in National Muffler was the validity of a tax regulation, while the issue in Chevron
involved the validity of a non-tax regulation.
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limit the types of services that qualify for the exemption,” and that the silence in
reference to the statute’s application to medical residents does not create ambiguity
(United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Florida (11th Cir. 2007)). It further
clarified that if Congress had wanted to make medical residents ineligible for the
student exemption, it could have easily created a specific exclusion. Thus, given the
lack of ambiguity in the statute’s definition of the status of “student,” there was no
reason to consider additional interpretive tools.
4. THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS CASES, THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT:
UNIVERISTY OF CHICAGO HOSPITALS V. U.S.
The University of Chicago Hospital is a teaching hospital affiliated with the
University of Chicago. For tax years 1995 and 1996, the hospital filed a request for
refund of FICA taxes paid on behalf of its medical residents in the amount of
$5,572,705. The IRS did not respond to the request and the hospital sued.
The IRS‟s motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Tres. Reg.
31.3121(b)(10)-2(d) rendered all medical residents per se ineligible for the student
FICA exception was denied by the district court (The University of Chicago Hospitals
v. United States (N.D. Ill. 2006)). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court’s finding that the statute was not ambiguous. In so doing, it echoed the Eleventh
Circuit’s rationale in Mount Sinai, holding that “there is nothing in the statute itself
that categorically excludes medical residents from eligibility for the student
exception” (University of Chicago Hospitals v. United States (7th Cir. 2008)). Thus,
the student exception “does not preclude medical residents from attempting to bring
themselves within the exemption from FICA tax liability” (University of Chicago
Hospitals v. United States (7th 2008)). The court went on to say that because the
statute unambiguously “does not categorically exclude medical residents from
eligibility for the student exception,” the regulations promulgated under Section
3121(b)(10) are not entitled to any level of deference (University of Chicago
Hospitals v. United States (7th 2008)).
5. THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS CASES, THE SIXTH CIRCUIT:
U.S. V. DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER
The district court in this case (United States v. Detroit Medical Center, (E.D.
Mich. 2006)) took the position that Section 3121(b)(10) and its corresponding
regulations are ambiguous and therefore, based on legislative history, held that
medical residents do not qualify as students for purposes of the student FICA
exception. The medical residents in question participated in the graduate medical
training and education program jointly operated between Wayne State University and
Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 12, 2011
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the Detroit Medical Center. At issue was $15 million which had been paid and
refunded to the medical center as FICA taxes on stipends paid to residents from 1995
to 2003.
The Sixth Circuit was unwilling to patently dismiss the possibility that medical
residents could qualify as students under the student exception. Refusing to rule one
way or the other under the circumstances in this case, the court listed a number of
facts that the district court should gather and consider on remand to determine
whether the medical residents were students. Among these were: 1) the number of
hours worked by a resident in a typical week relative to the number of hours spent in
the classroom and 2) the type of responsibilities vested to medical residents and under
what level of supervision they operated when providing patient care (United States v.
Detroit Medical Center, (6th Cir. 2009)).
Most importantly, the court found that the language of the statute was clear and
in no need of additional regulatory interpretation. In so doing the court implicitly
acknowledged that the statute could be properly applied once the proper facts were
before the court.
6. THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS CASES, THE SECOND CIRCUIT:
U.S. V. MEMORIAL SLOAN-KETTERING CANCER CTR.
In United States v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr. (2d. Cir. 2009), the
Second Circuit Court overturned a district court ruling that medical residents do not
qualify as students on account of the lack of ambiguity in Section 3121(b)(10). In
accordance with the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, the court found that
because the statute “expressly defines which individuals fall within the scope of the
student exception,” its meaning is unambiguous (United States v. Memorial SloanKettering Cancer Ctr. (2d. Cir. 2009)). Thus, the IRS‟s contention that, as a matter of
law, medical residents are not students was once again rejected. The court concluded,
as did those discussed above, that the determination of whether a medical resident is a
student is a factual analysis to be made on a case-by-case basis after introduction into
evidence the nature of the medical residents‟ relationship with the hospital.
7. THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS CASES, THE EIGTH CIRCUIT:
MAYO FOUNDATION FOR MEDICAL ED. & RES. V. U.S.
The Mayo Foundation case was the Eighth Circuit’s chance to close the spigot
of litigation it opened when it found in Minnesota v. Apfel (8th Cir. 1998) that medical
residents‟ services fell within the student exception to the Social Security Act. In fact,
the Mayo Foundation case was filed in reliance on the holding in Minnesota v. Apfel
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(8th Cir. 1998) and was one of over 7,000 claims for refund of FICA taxes filed
subsequent to the Apfel ruling (Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research
v. United States (8th Cir. 2009)). This time, however, with a tax year subsequent to
the effective date of the new regulations‟ full-time employee exclusion from the
student exception, the court found that medical residents were subject to FICA taxes.
The court’s gateway to applying the amended regulation was by means of the
Chevron analysis. As to the first question, of whether Congress had spoken to the
“precise question at issue,” the court found the existence of silence and thus,
ambiguity, in the statute as it relates to the application of the student FICA exception
to medical residents. In so doing, the court rejected the other courts of appeals‟
reasoning that because the statute was capable of unambiguous application based on
the common and plain meaning of the words contained in the statute, its meaning is
clear. To reach this conclusion the Mayo Foundation court created or acknowledged a
theretofore created exception to the application of the statute within its common and
plain meaning for tax cases. Mayo Foundation cited National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v.
United States (1979), where the Supreme Court upheld a Treasury Regulation
construing words that had a unique or uncommon meaning under the tax statute. Thus,
it concluded that the statute was silent or ambiguous on the question of whether a
medical resident working for the school fulltime is a “student who is enrolled and
regularly attending classes” (Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v.
United States (2009)).
As to the second prong of the analysis, the court cited Chevron’s proclamation
that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute” (Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
(1984)). This relatively low bar of permissible construction was deemed satisfied by
the amended regulations because they did not conflict, i.e. they harmonized with the
statute, and were a reasonable interpretation.
Hence, the court found in the face of what it deemed an ambiguous statute a
permissible interpretation under the amended regulations. And thus, the court that
started the onslaught of litigation in the context of whether medical residents qualify
for the student FICA exception, found a way to put an end to it (at least within it owns
circuit).
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8. THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS CASES, DISTINGUISHING FACTS
BUT NOT LEGAL OUTCOMES: THE EFFECTIVE DATE ISSUE
It is critical to acknowledge at this point that the tax years at issue in the first
four cases discussed in this section expired before the effective date of Tres. Reg.
31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)‟s full-time employee exclusion (which, as referenced above, was
April 1, 2005). This means that the full-time employee exclusion was not in effect
during those years. Contrastingly, the tax period in question in the Mayo Foundation
case was subsequent to the effective date of the new regulation. However, this factual
distinction in the case must be taken in the context of the legal holdings in the first
four circuit court cases. That context is this: the effective date notwithstanding, there
is no reason to believe that the courts‟ lines of reasoning in the first four cases would
have differed had the full-time employee exception been in effect during the tax years
in question. The courts found that additional statutory interpretation was not necessary
because understanding of the plain meaning of the term “student” was readily
ascertainable. This conclusion applied to regulations in effect during the tax years in
question, as well as subsequently issued regulations such as the full-time exclusion of
Tres. Reg. 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d).
V. THE COURTS’ RATIONALES AND THE QUESTION OF AMBIGUITY
AND SILENCE
The question post-Mayo Foundation is really one of the presences, or lack
thereof, of ambiguity in the statute. It was the court’s answer to the question of
ambiguity that allowed it to move to the regulatory guidance and the full-time
employee exclusion. Consider the statutory language of Section 3121(b)(10) verbatim
to the extent it is relevant here. Under the statute the term “employment” shall not
include—
(10) service performed in the employ of—a school, college, or university, if
such service is performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending
classes at such school, college, or university;
This language which creates the student FICA exception does not forthrightly
provide that medical residents are students. Rather it provides a statutory regime
through which one can determine whether an employee qualifies for the student
exception. Whether she is a medical resident or a traditional student, the individual
must be a student who is enrolled and regularly attends classes. In the view of the
Second, Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, this is not an ambiguous instruction.
According to the Eighth Circuit and now the Supreme Court, it is.

Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 12, 2011

12

Take the analysis one step further and consider the distinguishing factor in the
courts‟ rationales that led one of them to find ambiguity and the others to find clarity.
Ultimately it was whether the court was willing to find ambiguity in silence—more
specifically, whether the court was willing to translate silence as to the subset
category of medical residents into silence as to who qualifies as a student generally
under the statute. Hence consideration of how each of the courts dealt with the issue
of silence in the statute is worth closer examination.
1. ANALYZING SILENCE: AN INCLUSIONARY INTERPRETATION
The Eleventh Circuit, in Mt. Sinai Medical Center, found the statute’s silence
to be inclusionary in terms of the statute’s scope and put the burden on Congress to
affirmatively exclude taxpayers under the plain terms of the statute. “If Congress had
wanted to make medical residents ineligible for the student exemption, it could have
easily crafted a specific exclusion, . . ., which excludes medical and dental interns and
residents . . .” (United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Florida (11th Cir.
2007)). Thus, the silence was not an indication of ambiguity, but rather, an implied
inclusion of medical residents within the scope of the student FICA exception. In the
view of the court, the language of the statute was entirely clear, and if it was
Congress’s intent to exclude medical residents from the student FICA exception, it
was up to Congress to fix that mistake.
In University of Chicago Hospitals, the Seventh Circuit, took a similar
“included, unless specifically excluded” rationale: “there is nothing in the statute itself
that categorically excludes medical residents from attempting to bring themselves
within the exemption from FICA tax liability” (University of Chicago Hospitals v.
United States (7th Cir. 2008)). As to the question of silence in the statute, the court
held that, “silence on the specific subject of medical residents does not necessarily
mean it is ambiguous” (University of Chicago Hospitals v. United States (7th Cir.
2008)). Thus, under the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, the student FICA exception could
apply to medical residents up and until Congress unambiguously excluded medical
residents from eligibility.
The Second Circuit’s treatment of silence in United States v. Memorial
SloanKettering Cancer Center (2d Cir. 2009) closely followed the Seventh’s Circuit’s
rationale. The court held: “the statute expressly defines which individuals fall within
the scope of the student exception: students who are „enrolled and regularly attending
classes” (United States v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (2d Cir. 2009)).
According to the court, “this language is not ambiguous” (United States v. Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (2d Cir. 2009)). Echoing the Seventh Circuit, the court
adopted the rationale that the statute’s silence on the specific issue of whether medical
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residents qualify as students under the student FICA exception did not amount to
ambiguity with respect to the statute at-large.
This line of reasoning, however, is subject to scrutiny on the grounds that
Section 3121(b)(10) provides a list of exclusions from the general definition of
“employee” for purposes of the FICA exception. That being the case, should not the
list itself be interpreted in an exclusionary manner so that all employees not
specifically listed are not exempt from FICA tax? This ultimately depends on where
the court focuses its analysis. If the court views the term employee broadly, and
interprets all exclusions listed in Section 3121(b), including the student FICA
exception, narrowly, it will likely interpret the definition in Section 3121(b)(10) to be
an exclusionary one—one that is ambiguous unless specifically listed. On the other
hand, if the court views the term “employee” narrowly and interprets the exclusions
broadly so that those not specifically excluded from the plain terms of the list are
included in the exception, the court will find medical residents exempt from FICA tax
obligations with an inclusionary interpretation.
At the same time, an exclusionary rationale may be more precise in terms of
judicial restraint. If the court’s role is to interpret the law by reference to the language
of the statute, then the Eleventh and the Seventh Circuits‟ analyses would seem to be
inappropriate.
2. ANALYZING SILENCE: PLAIN AND COMMON MEANING
INTERPRETATION
In Detroit Medical Center, the Sixth Circuit concluded that in the absence of a
specific definition of the term “student,” the plain and common meaning of the word
should apply. In light of this interpretation, the court concluded that a case-by-case
analysis of a resident’s relationship with his or her teaching hospital was necessary to
determine whether the services rendered by the resident qualified for the student FICA
exemption.
3. ANALYZING SILENCE: AN EXCLUSIONARY INTERPRETATION
The Eighth Circuit's broad definition of silence, contrasted with the Eleventh,
Seventh, and Sixth circuits, was an exclusionary one. That is, its interpretation was
that if the statute does not specifically speak to the status of medical residents in
relation to their qualification for the student FICA exception, it must be ambiguous on
that issue and therefore, ripe for additional elucidation from relevant regulations,
which exclude full-time employees from the student exception.

Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, General Research, Volume 12, 2011

14

So, what gave rise to the differing opinions between the circuits? The
underlying difference is the Eighth Circuit’s full application of the Chevron doctrine.
Under the first prong of Chevron, the issue is whether, “Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue.” In making this determination, the Supreme Court
held in Chevron, that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute” (Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.
(1984)). Thus, silence on the question of whether a medical resident working for a
school qualifies for the student FICA exception was sufficient to find ambiguity and
move to the regulation’s full-time exception interpretation of the underlying statute.
One might argue that the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute was
ultimately correct under Chevron. Silence, according to Chevron, as it relates to a
specific issue, is sufficient to then move to the underlying regulation to determine how
the statute should be applied. The specific issue here was whether medical residents
qualified as students for purposes of the student FICA exception, and medical
residents are not mentioned at all in Section 3121(b)(10). Therefore, moving to the
regulation to determine how the statute should be applied was, according to the Eighth
Circuit, and subsequently the Supreme Court, proper.
But consider the application of this broad definition of ambiguity through
silence: anything not addressed directly and specifically in the statute would be ripe
for additional agency regulation. At that point, what purpose does the language of the
statute serve except as an invitation for the Department of Treasury to tell us what the
tax law really is? This line of reasoning begs the question, what if Congress wishes
the statute to be the law wholly and completely, is it then Congress’s burden to
address within the statute every potential application of the law? Practically speaking,
it is not reasonable to expect Congress to address every conceivable set of
circumstances that could potentially arise within the statute’s application. What is
reasonable, however, is for Congress to create a workable statutory framework.
Congress can also assume that this framework will be applied by courts when
interpreting the law. Thus, the exclusionary interpretation, taken to its logical
conclusion, gives any court the ability to practically disregard the statute and move to
the regulations by narrowing how the issue is framed until the statute is deemed silent.
Such an analysis gives the regulations too much deference and diminishes the
language of the statute itself. The Supreme Court, however, was willing to accept this
broad definition of ambiguity through silence. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Roberts held that the student exception was ambiguous and therefore properly
subjected to interpretive guidance from the Department of Treasury. Moreover,
because that guidance was deemed to be a “reasonable construction” of the law, it
would be up to Congress to override the regulation (Mayo Foundation (2011)).
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VI. MEDICAL RESIDENTS AS STUDENTS: A PRACTICAL ANALYSIS
1. INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS
The discussion above presents analysis of the legal question of whether a
medical resident is a student for purposes of the student FICA exception. According to
the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court, as a matter of law, medical residents are
not students under the student FICA exception. The remaining courts found ultimately
that medical residents were not ineligible to qualify as students under the student
FICA exception, but stopped short of saying all medical residents qualify. Thus, the
question in those Circuits was a question of fact—a facts and circumstances
analysis—under which a medical resident was eligible to qualify as a student if he or
she was enrolled and regularly attending classes, as dictated by the statute.
In a number of the cases, the courts emphasize the fact that medical school graduates
cannot be licensed in their respective states without completing a one- or two-year
residency. Does this not indicate at least that their education is not yet complete since
they are not allowed to practice in the area in which they have received training for
the previous four years?
Consider this question in light of the additional information requested in United
States v. Detroit Medical Center (6th Cir. 2009). In that case, after finding that
medical residents could potentially qualify for the student FICA exception, the court
requested on remand that the parties answer the following questions to determine
whether the medical residents were students: (1) how many hours a week does a
typical resident spend at the hospital; (2) how many hours a week does a typical
resident spend in the classroom; (3) what other responsibilities does a typical resident
have under the program and how much time on average do they take each week; (4)
how is a typical resident’s time spent at the hospital: is it all spent providing patient
care and supervising other residents (or being on call to do these things), or does it
include other activities, and if so, what are they and how much time do they typically
take each week; (5) what role do professors play in supervising residents while they
provide patient care at the Medical Center; and (6) who employs the residents (Detroit
Medical Center (6th Cir. 2009)).
A case study has been performed surveying these questions in two different
ways to determine whether medical residents as a practical matter are students or not.
First, a current medical resident was interviewed and asked to respond to these
questions. His responses are discussed below. Second, the American Medical
Association’s website contains a database called FREIDA Online which provides
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information for all 8,700 graduate medical education programs accredited by the
Accreditation Council on Graduate Medical Education. According to its online
description, the FREIDA online data are collected by an annual survey called the
National GME Census which is proctored by the American Medical Association and
the Association of American Medical Colleges. Data analysis in light of the first two
quantitative factors dictated in Detroit Medical Center follows.
2. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS (INDIVIDUAL RESIDENT)
Dr. Lance D. Wood, a second-year medical resident in the Penn State
University/Milton S. Hershey Medical Center Dermatology Residency Program,
responded in an online interview to the questions posited by the court in Detroit
Medical Center (6th Cir. 2009). With respect to hospital hours worked in a typical
week, acknowledging that hours vary widely (sometimes 40 hours, sometimes 80
hours), Dr. Wood responded that dermatology residents work on average 65-70 hours
per week. Comparing this figure to classroom hours, Dr. Wood indicated that he
spends 5 to 10 hours per week in a classroom setting, generally participating in
educational conferences in one of the hospital conferences rooms.
In addition to patient care and furthering his dermatological education, which
Dr. Wood noted consume the vast majority of his time, he spends about an hour per
week conducting research, but generally does not have any other demands on his little
remaining time.
As to supervision and oversight, Dr. Wood explained that attending physicians
oversee the big picture, but residents are ultimately responsible for their individual
patients. Moreover, the attending physicians‟ level of oversight corresponds with each
resident’s level of experience; thus a third-year resident would have less oversight
than a first-year resident. All this notwithstanding, billing for the patients‟ care is
based on the attending physician’s performance of such services, even though
intermediately provided through a resident. Finally, Dr. Wood is employed by the
Medical Center, which is a branch of the Penn State University Medical School.
Considering the facts Dr. Wood provided in relation to the Penn State
University Dermatology Residency Program, does Dr. Wood’s services appear to be
those of an employee or a student? Likely the two most important factors indicating
the latter are the level of classroom exposure and the attending physician’s role in his
training. Up to 10 hours per week are spent by Dr. Wood in an educational setting,
advancing his knowledge of dermatology. This knowledge is accumulated and then
applied in patient care under the supervision of an attending physician. Even more
significant is that the patient is billed for care provided by the attending physician, not
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the medical resident. Thus, the level of proficiency with respect to services provided
is ultimately the responsibility of the attending physician and it is ultimately the
attending physician who is liable for such care. This relationship between attending
physicians and residents is likely the result of the fact that Dr. Wood, like other
medical residents, practices medicine with a Graduate Medical Trainee License, not a
license without restriction. This license by its very name suggests that Dr. Wood’s
education is on-going, and he should, therefore, still be considered a student for
practical, as well as for legal purposes, under Section 3121(b)(10).
3. FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES ANALYSIS (QUANTITATIVE)
To sample the plethora of data available on FREIDA online, ten residency
programs were randomly selected from the geographic boundaries of each of the
Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, that is, those which have held that
medical residents are capable of achieving the status of student based on a facts and
circumstances analysis. To simplify, this analysis was limited to the internal medicine
residency programs within the states of the respective circuits. Internal medicine was
selected because it generally has a yearly class of forty to fifty residents, where the
majority of other residency programs have five to ten positions. This, therefore,
provides a broader basis for analysis in terms of overall residents surveyed. The object
of this study is to apply a broad and general facts and circumstances analysis within
each circuit as to the likelihood of a court finding that the medical residents within the
circuit are students.
4. THE DATA
Within the geographical circumference of the Second Circuit exist sixty-nine
internal medicine residency programs. A sample of ten was randomly taken. Of those,
one was in Connecticut, eight were in New York, and one was in Vermont. On
average, medical residents participating in these programs spent 64.8 hours per week
in the hospital and an average of 7 hours per week in the classroom, for a ratio of
10.32
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TABLE 1: SECOND CIRCUIT (NY, CT, VT)

TABLE 2: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT (MI, OH, KY, TN)
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TABLE 3: SEVENTH CIRCUIT (WI, IL, IN)

TABLE 4: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT (AL, GA, FL)

hospital hours worked for everyone classroom hour. Among the sampled hospitals,
the hospital with the highest hospital hours required 74 and the lowest required 56.
The hospital with the most classroom hours required 16 and the hospital with the
fewest classroom hours required only 5. The lowest ratio of hospital hours to
classroom hours was the University of Vermont Program with 4.25 and the highest
was Bronx-Lebanon Hospital Center Program 14.80.
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Within the Sixth Circuit, the originator of the seven factors presented above,
the determination of whether medical residents are students under Section 3121(b)(10)
is a fact gathering expedition. Considering the quantitative factors proscribed by the
Detroit Medical Center court, on average, a random sample of ten of the forty-eight
internal medicine residency programs in the circuit had an average amount of time
spent in the hospital of 66.1 hours and an average of 8.9 hours of classroom time each
week. In terms of ratios, on average, for everyone hour spent in the classroom, a
typical internal medicine resident would spend 7.85 hours in the hospital. Other data:
the most arduous hospital schedule was 74 hours per week and the lowest was 57.
Contrastingly, the program with the most required classroom hours required 15 hours
per week while the least amount of classroom hours required was 7. With respect to
ratios, the highest number of hours spent in the hospital for everyone hour spent in the
classroom was 10.57 at Fairview Hospital in Cleveland, OH. The lowest ratio was
3.80 hospital hours for every one classroom hour at TriHealth (Good Samaritan)
Hospital located in Cincinnati, OH.
On a random sample of ten of twenty-nine internal medicine residency
programs within the Seventh Circuit’s geographic boundaries, on average medical
residents spent 60 hours per week in the hospital and 7 hours per week in the
classroom. The average ratio of hospital hours to classroom hours was 9.51. The most
classroom hours required by any sampled hospital in the Seventh Circuit was 70; the
lowest was 50. The most classroom hours required is 10; the lowest was 4. As to
ratios, the highest number of hospital hours for every one classroom hour was 17.50 at
the University of Chicago program; the lowest ratio was 5.50 at the Louis A. Weiss
Memorial Hospital, also a Chicago hospital, but affiliated with the University of
Illinois.
In total there are twenty-one internal medical residency programs within the
confines of the Eleventh Circuit. Within the 10 schools sampled the average hospital
hours required of residents was 61.8, while the average classroom hours required was
8.6. The highest and lowest hospital hours were 72 and 50 respectively.
Comparatively, the highest and lowest classroom hours were 11 and 5 respectively.
For everyone hour of classroom time, on average 7.4 hours were spent in the hospital.
The lowest result considering this ratio was 5 hospital hours for every 1 classroom
hour; the highest result was 7.84 hospital hours for every 1 classroom hour. The
highest hospital to classroom hours ratio was at the University of Alabama’s program
where 14.40 hours were spent in the hospital for everyone classroom hour. The lowest
ratio was 5.0 to 1 at Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, FL.
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5. C OMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Given that this is only a partial analysis of what would be an overall
examination of the facts and circumstances pertaining to medical residents and their
respective programs, only broad assertions can be made with respect to the
quantitative data. With these assertions regarding each of the four circuits, discussion
will be given over to the status of each circuit overall based on the sampling, and
specific mention will be made of teaching hospitals with particularly high or low
hospital to classroom hours ratios. This analysis is based on the general premise, at
least with respect to the quantitative portion of the facts and circumstances analysis,
that the lower the hospital/classroom hours ratio, the more likely a medical resident
will qualify as a student under Section 3121(b)(10).
The Eleventh Circuit’s sampling had the lowest average ratio of 7.84. This
result is reflective of the circuit as a whole as there was no one program that pulled
down the ratio due to a high number of classroom hours. For example, 7 of the 10
programs had a range of 9 to 11 classroom hours, but none more than 11. Compare
this result with the next lowest average ratio of 7.85 in the Sixth Circuit. This result is
largely due to one particular program, the TriHealth (Good Samaritan Hospital)
program which requires a whopping 15 hours of classroom time per week compared
to only 57 hospital hours, putting the TriHealth program in a very strong position with
respect to earning student status under Section 3121(b)(10).
The highest ratio of hospital to classroom hours, on average, came from the
Seventh Circuit where 6 of the 10 sampled programs had classroom hours in the range
of 4 to 7. Most significant among those was the University of Chicago’s program
whose ratio was 17.50 with only 4 classroom hours per week. This high ratio would
complicate the University of Chicago program’s bid to qualify its medical residents as
students and would likely require strong qualitative factors to qualify for the student
exception under Section 3121(b)(10).
The Second Circuit would most certainly have had the highest average ratio
were it not for the University of Vermont’s program, which had the survey-wide,
second lowest ratio of 4.25 hospital hours for every classroom hour. Otherwise, within
the Second Circuit, the number of classroom hours compared to programs sampled in
the other circuits was sparse with 8 of the 10 programs having classroom hours within
the range of 5 to 7 hours per week. While the University of Vermont’s attempt to
qualify its residents as students would likely succeed with even marginal qualitative
factors, a number of the other programs in the Second Circuit would struggle to have
their residents fall within the student exception.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Given the lack of ambiguity in the statute, the Supreme Court should have
decided the issue of whether medical residents qualify for the student exception
through a factual analysis considering each residency program’s relationship with its
residents. As opposed to the Department of Treasury’s arbitrary full-time employee
exclusion, this approach would have been a more accurate way to determine whether a
resident should qualify for the student FICA exception.
APPENDIX 1: TABLE OF CASES
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APPENDIX 2: DATA COMPILATION
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